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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j). The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over cases transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
This appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3). This appeal was subject to transfer by the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102(4). The Utah Supreme Court elected to transfer this case to the Court of
Appeals in an order dated July 10, 2008. R. at 1117.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of the
June 3, 2008, Order and Decision by the Honorable James R. Taylor granting
summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills and dismissing the Harveys'
disconnection petition. The ultimate legal question is whether or not the Harveys
should be allowed to seek a disconnection from Cedar Hills. Included within this
review are the following issues:
I.

Is there a material difference between the 2001 and 2003
disconnection statutes with respect to the issue of unincorporated
islands between cities?
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II.

Does the creation of an island of unincorporated territory completely
surrounded by incorporated land absolutely determine the outcome in
a disconnection matter under both 2001 and 2003 statutes?

III.

Should the substantive requirements of the 2003 amendments to the
disconnection statute be retroactively applied in this 2001 case?

IV.

Are the Harveys entitled to present relevant evidence that supports
the viability of the disconnection as well as demonstrates that the
disconnection promotes the interests of justice and equity?

STATUTES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
I.

Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-503 (2001) - Criteria for disconnection:

(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which
the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality.
(2) In making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on: (a) the city or
community as a whole; (b) adjoining property owners; (c) existing or
projected streets or public ways; (d) water mains and water services; (e)
sewer mains and sewer services; (f) law enforcement; (g) zoning; (h) other
municipal services; and (i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and
varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be
disconnected.
II.

Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-505(4) (2001) - The court shall order
disconnection:

Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall
order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in
Section 10-2-503.

-2-

III.

Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003) - Unincorporated
islands are not allowed:

The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence:(a) the viability of the disconnection; (b) that justice and equity
require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality; (c) that the
proposed disconnection will not: (i) leave the municipality with an area
within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of
providing municipal services would materially increase over previous years;
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to
continue to function as a municipality; or (iii) leave or create one or more
islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and (d) that the county in
which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a costeffective manner amd without materially increasing the county's costs of
providing municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the
municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection.
IV.

Utah Code Annotated. § 68-3-3, 1953 as Amended - Retroactive
Effect:

No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
V.

"H.B. 98" 2003 General Session of the Utah State Legislature Session in which the amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501 et
seq. were passed:

"The act modifies the criteria for disconnection and modifies the procedure
for disconnection.'"
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because this issue is a question of law, the appellate court gives no
deference to the trial judge's determination and applies a "correctness" standard,
deciding the matter for itself. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case that has been in litigation since 2001. R. at 13. In addition to
the present disconnection matter filed by the Harveys, the City of Cedar Hills has
filed a condemnation action, and the Harveys have filed a claim based on
constitutional rights violations. R. at 23; 46. The companion case for
condemnation filed by Cedar Hills (which has been consolidated into the present
case but which was previously case number 010404045) and the companion claim
filed by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for constitutional rights violations (which
has been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number
010404044) are not at issue at this time. R. at 1111. Pursuant to the order of the
District court, these cases are stayed pending this appeal of this disconnection
matter. Id.
The parties filed various motions for summary judgment. R. at 148, 191,
494. This appeal concerns only the most recent order of the district court filed on
June 3, 2008, which granted summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills as to the
disconnection issue. R. at 1112; Addendum at 61.
On April 4, 2008, the court heard arguments on the Harveys1 Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment to Determine Appropriate Statutory Standard. R. at
1010. Addendum at 29. The motion requested clarification on which version of
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the Utah Restriction of Municipal Limits Act, Title 10, Chapter 2, part 5 of the
Utah Code (hereinafter "the disconnection statute") was to be applied. R. at 750;
Addendum at 21.
At the hearing, the court elected to avoid making a decision as to which
statute applied. R. at 1112; Addendum at 61. Instead, the court found that "there
is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between the two versions
of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection
statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated island, the
disconnection should be disallowed." See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111;
Id. As a result, the court did not enter into an analysis of whether the 2003
disconnection statute should be applied retroactively because the opinion of the
court was that the disconnection petition would fail under either statute. Id.
The Harveys appeal this order as an erroneous determination of law.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case.
1.

The appellants, David and Dixie Harvey, are the landowners of a
parcel of land in Utah County which was annexed into Cedar Hills in
1997. R. at 7; Addendum at 12.

2.

The property lies on the boundary between the cities of Cedar Hills
and Pleasant Grove.

3.

R. at 6; Addendum at 19.

Due to an on-going dispute with the city regarding zoning and use of
their property, the Harveys filed a Petition to Disconnect from Cedar
Hills in August 2001. R. at 7; Addendum at 12.

4.

Following the filing of the disconnection petition, the City of Cedar
Hills filed a condemnation action seeking to condemn the Harveys'
property for use as a city park. R. at 23. The Harveys filed an
unconstitutional takings claim. The three cases were consolidated into
one action and the district court determined that the disconnection
matter should proceed first. R. at 1111; Addendum at 61.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the City of
Cedar Hills in the disconnection matter. This ruling was based on the court's
determination that there was no material difference between the 2001 and 2003
disconnection statutes with respect to the dispositive issue of islands of
unincorporated territory between cities. This determination ignores the plain, clear
language of the 2001 statute that differs noticeably from the 2003 amendments in
both the definition of an island and the significance that an unincorporated island
should have in the final determination.
While the Harveys' disconnection may be prohibited under the 2003
amendments, it is not prohibited by the 2001 statute. The appropriate statutory
standard is the 2001 statute because it was effective at the time this action was
filed. The 2003 amendments modify the substantive law governing disconnection
by creating new factors, new "criteria," the district court must consider in making
its decision. As such, there should be no retroactive application of the 2003
amendments.
Under the 2001 statute, the City of Cedar Hills should not have been granted
summary judgment and the Harveys should be given an opportunity to present
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evidence supporting the viability of the disconnection as well as the fact that it
promotes the interests of justice and equity.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT
THE 2001 AND 2003 DISCONNECTION STATUTES WERE
SUBSTANTIVELY IDENTICAL

The district court ruled that under either the 2001 or 2003 disconnection
statutes a disconnection petition must be denied where the proposed disconnection
will create an island of unincorporated territory. At the hearing, both the court and
counsel for Cedar Hills acknowledged that the 2003 amendments to the
disconnection statute modified the weight that the court was to give to the issue of
unincorporated islands. See Oral Argument Transcript, 19:15-25 (Addendum at
47); 20:1-19 (Addendum at 48). R. at 1122. However, the court ultimately
determined that the 2001 statute must have intended that the unincorporated island
criteria be dispositive. Id., 24:19-20; Addendum at 52. Despite the court's
acknowledgment that the 2001 statute did not contain plain language to that fact,
the court proceeded to impute the legislative intent in this matter. Id., 24:12-13.
The court's written order states that "there is no material difference on the
dispositive point of law between the two versions of the statute at issue. Under
either the 2001 or 2003 versions of the disconnection statute, if a disconnection
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would result in an unincorporated island, the disconnection should be disallowed."
See Order dated June 3, 2008. R. at 1111; Addendum at 61.
The plain language of the two versions of the statutes do not support this
ruling. Statutory construction begins and, if possible, ends with the statute's plain
language. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2002); State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 990
(Utah 1999).
Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its
plain meaning. While the 2003 disconnection statute could reasonably be
interpreted as prohibiting disconnection where an unincorporated island is created,,
the 2001 disconnection statute is materially different on that point. The Harveys
appeal the district court's decision on this issue as an erroneous interpretation of
the law.
A-

The 2003 Disconnection Statute Clearly Disallows Unincorporated
Islands

Under the 2003 version of the disconnection statute, the provisions
regarding the creation of islands of unincorporated territory are unambiguous. The
statute expressly provides that the burden of proof is on the petitioners who must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed disconnection will not
leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory. This
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provision clearly states that if an island of unincorporated territory is created by the
disconnection then the disconnection petition must be denied:
The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . ( c ) that the proposed disconnection
will not . . . (iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of
unincorporated territory;
Utah Code. Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003); Addendum at 4.
B.

The 2001 Disconnection Statute only Disallows Unincorporated
Islands "within95 the Boundaries of the Municipality from which
the Territory is to be Disconnected.

Contrary to the opinion of the district court, the 2001 version of the
disconnection statute contains no mandate for denying a petition that creates an
island of unincorporated territory. In fact, the 2001 statute does not even contain
the term "island of unincorporated territory." The relevant section reads as
follows:
10-2-503. Criteria for disconnection.
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which
the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would
materially increase over previous years or for which it would become
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality.
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shall consider all
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on:
(a) the city or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
-10-

(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning;
(h) other municipal services; and
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and variedshaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the
boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be
disconnected,
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503 (2001)(emphasis added). Addendum at 1.

The criteria for determining whether or not to grant a disconnection petition
under the 2001 statute are contained in Section 10-2-503(1), Addendum at 1.
Specifically, the court is mandated to determine "whether or not disconnection will
leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost,
requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase
over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically
unreasonable to administer as a municipality.55 Subsection 10-2-503(2)
(Addendum at 1) indicates that the court must consider all of the listed criteria as
well as any other relevant evidence in making the determination of the previously
stated factors.

Once the court determines whether or not the disconnection is

-11-

viable and not overly burdensome, section 10-2-505(4) (Addendum at 3) requires
that "the court shall order disconnection."1
The reference to islands and peninsulas in this section is wholly
distinguishable from the reference in the 2003 amendments. First, the 2001 statute
does not refer to "unincorporated islands," but rather refers to islands that are
wholly "within" the boundaries of the municipality or peninsulas that project into
the "boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected."
Further, the 2001 statute does not indicate that the existence of islands is
dispositive in the disconnection hearing. It is simply one of the factors to be
"considered."
Unincorporated Islands are not Prohibited
The two definitions of "island" in the two versions of the disconnection
statutes are very different. The "islands" referred to in the 2001 statute are islands
which "result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which
the territory is to be disconnected." Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-503(2)(i) (2001);
Addendum at 1. This language clearly identifies the "islands" in question as
pockets of unincorporated territory entirely surrounded by the municipality from

1

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505(4) (2001). Considering all the evidence and the commissioners'
report, the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria
in Section 10-2-503.
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which disconnection is requested. Id. This is distinguishable from the 2003
definition of "islands of unincorporated territory" where an "island" is defined as
unincorporated territory that is completely surrounded by incorporated territory
without reference to which city or cities lie on the borders of the "island." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) (2003); Addendum at 4.
This subtle, but clear, distinction in the definition of island is particularly
important given the facts of this case. The parcel in question lies on the boundary
of Pleasant Grove and Cedar Hills. If disconnection were granted, there could
temporarily be an area of unincorporated land in between these two municipalities.
Under the definition in the 2003 statute, the island of unincorporated
territory would result in the mandatory denial of the disconnection petition.
However, under the definition in the 2001 statute, no island is created because the
unincorporated territory would be adjacent to Cedar Hills, not "within" the
boundaries of Cedar Hills. A peninsula would not be created in this case because
the property in question does not awkwardly jut into either city.
Plain Meaning of "Considerf>
Even if an island were to be created under the 2001 statute, section 10-2503(2) requires only that the court "consider" all relevant evidence in a
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disconnection matter including the island issue. The term "consider" is commonly
held to mean "to think about before arriving at a judgment or decision."2
Therefore, this section simply requires that the court "think about" the issue
of islands and peninsulas created by disconnection, but contains no mandate that
the court deny a petition for disconnection simply because it creates an island. The
section provides no specific guidelines for the court with respect to the enumerated
factors other than a requirement that the court "consider" them in making its
determination.
Under the plain language of this statute, even if an island is created, the
"court shall order disconnection" (Utah Code Ann. §10-2-505(4) (2001)) if the
factors as a whole do not "leave the municipality with a residual area within its
boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services
would materially increase over previous years or for which it would become
economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-2-503(1) (2001), Addendum at 1.
Where the statute is plain in its requirement that the court simply consider a
factor as part of its decision-making process, it is inappropriate and erroneous for

2

"Consider" - Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2008.
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the court to impute from the language that the legislature intended such a factor to
be dispositive.
C.

The 2001 and 2003 Disconnection Statutes are Substantively
Different and Distinguishable

The district court identified the issue of whether or not an island of
unincorporated territory would be created by the disconnection as the dispositive
issue in this case. As stated above, the two versions of the disconnection statute
are completely distinguishable with respect to this issue both in the definition of an
island and the weight that the court should assign to this factor. In the 2003
statute, the creation of any unincorporated island is a complete bar to
disconnection. The court has no discretion in the matter. Under the 2001 statute,
only unincorporated islands that are wholly within the boundary of the city are
considered to be a factor, and even then, the existence of the island is not
dispositive. The court has discretion to grant the petition based on the totality of
the evidence.
Essentially, the 2003 amendments re-defined an island of unincorporated
territory and moved the issue of islands and peninsulas from the list of items to be
considered (in 2001) as part of the fairness determination to the list of mandatory
criteria that must be met before a disconnection is valid (in 2003).
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The court ignored the plain language of the statutes with respect to this issue
and erroneously ruled them to be substantively identical. As such, the court denied
the Harveys the opportunity to present evidence of the viability of the
disconnection and whether the interests of justice and equity would be served by
disconnection.
II.

THE 2001 DISCONNECTION STATUTE IS THE
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY STANDARD IN
THIS MATTER

In an effort to get a very "quick, clear summary judgment," the district court
ruled that there was no need to determine whether the 2003 amendments should be
applied retroactively because both statutes were identical with respect to the
dispositive issue. Oral Argument Transcript 26:16-18. R. at 1122; Addendum at
54. However, this determination is essential because if the court determines that the
substantive requirements of the 2001 statute are the appropriate standard, the
Harveys1 disconnection is not prohibited by the creation of an unincorporated
island. The Harveys deserve the right to be allowed their day in court to present
evidence in support of their disconnection petition.
A.

The General Rule is that Statutory Amendments will not be
Applied Retroactively

Utah Code provides that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared/1 Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Addendum at 5.
-16-

Consequently, legislation is not given retroactive effect especially with regards to
substantive changes in legislation. See e.g. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R.
Co.,104 P.3d 1185 (2004) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204,208(1988)).
Utah courts follow the general rule that "a statute generally cannot be given
retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the
statute." Washington Nat7 Ins. Co. v. SheiwoodAssocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986)); see also Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952,
953 (Utah 1987); In reJ.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 (Utah 1982).
The Utah Legislature did not expressly indicate its intent that these
provisions be applied retroactively. Neither did the legislature intend the changes
to be exclusively procedural. To the contrary, the legislature clearly intended the
changes in the disconnection statute to be substantive in nature. The 2003
amendments to the disconnection statute were presented before the Utah legislature
as House Bill No. 98 of the 2003 General Session. The introduction to H.B. 98
specifically states: "The act modifies the criteria for disconnection and modifies
the procedure for disconnection." (Emphasis added.) See "H.B 98" 2003 General
Session of the Utah State Legislature. Addendum at 6.
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B.

The Harveys' Substantive Rights will be Affected if the 2003
Amendments to the Disconnection Statute are Applied
Retroactively

The Utah Supreme Court has previously found that amendments that alter
the substantive law governing disconnection by creating new factors the district
court must consider in making its decision should not be applied retroactively. In
Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah
1983).
The 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute create several new
criteria that the court must evaluate in making its decision. This brief has
addressed at length the significant substantive differences between the 2001 and
2003 disconnection statutes with respect to the treatment of unincorporated islands
and peninsulas. However, this is not the only substantive difference between the
two statutes.
The 2003 statute adds the burden upon the petitioner to prove that the
disconnection will not:
[Ljeave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the
cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services
would materially increase over previous years, make it economically or
practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a
municipality, or leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of
unincorporated territory.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (2003); Addendum at 4.
-18-

Additionally, the 2001 version of the statute also mandates that the court
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in
section 10-2-503. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505(4) (2001), Addendum at 3. This
mandatory language contained in the 2001 statute places the emphasis for the
court's decision on the specific statutory criteria of the viability of the
disconnection and the relative burden that would result from disconnection rather
than focusing on issues that are only tangentially related to the disconnection
matter through the vague terms "justice and equity."
The application of these statutory changes will certainly affect the
substantive rights of the Harveys. As indicated above, the retroactive application
of the 2003 amendments would deny the Harveys any opportunity to present
evidence in this matter because their disconnection petition would be dismissed
due to the creation of an island of unincorporated territory. The burden placed on
the Harveys at trial would also be greater. Indeed, the Harveys will be in far less
favorable circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the decision of the district
court that granted summary judgment to the City of Cedar Hills. The matter
should be remanded to the district court with instructions to hear evidence and
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make a final determination based upon the substantive criteria outlined in the 2001
disconnection statute.
Dated this 6

day of January 2009.
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C

Gordon Duval
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID and DIXIE HARVEY,
individually and as trustees,
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10-2-503

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

The issue of 'justice and equity" is largely
based on fact as found by trial court whose
rulings should not be disturbed unless it is
made to appear clearly erroneous In re Layton
City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P 2 d 948 (1972)
Decree disconnecting an 80 acre tract from
city was consistent with "justice and equity"
where (1) the 80 acre tract was half of parcel
and other half was outside city boundary (2)
the topography of the parcel made it desirable
to develop the entire 160 acres as one tiact, (3)
the tract withm the city was without streets,
improvements, or buildings, (4) the city was
providing the tract with no municipal services,
and (5) disconnection of the tract would cause
neither an impairment of municipal functions
nor a substantial loss of tax revenue to t h e city
In re Layton City, 27 Utah 2d 241, 494 P 2 d 948
(1972)
The determination of w h a t constitutes "jus
tice and equity" t u r n s on the facts of each

individual case, and district courts findings
will not be disturbed on appeal unless cleady
erroneous In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 668 P 2 d 544 (Utah 1983)
T e r m s of severance.
The matter of the adjustmem of the terms
upon which the territory shall be severed from
the town or city is a matter t h a t must be
brought to the attention of t h e commissioners,
and not to the court before their appomtme it
In re Fullmei, 33 Utah 43, 92 P 768 (1908)
(decided under former section, authorizing
commissioners to adjust terms)
Validity of petition.
Petition to disconnect, defective because it
was not signed by a majority of registered
voters (before 1993 amendment of this sectisn
substituting pioperty owners for voters) was
properly dismissed South Jordan City v Saniy
City, 870 P 2 d 273 (Utah 1994)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations
§§ 59 to 61

10-2-503.

Criteria for disconnection.

(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will
leave the municipality with a i esidual area within its boundaries for which the
cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially
increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or
practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality
(2) In making t h a t determination, the commissioners shall consider all
relevant factors including the effect of the disconnection on
(a) the city or community as a whole,
(b) adjoining property owners,
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways,
(d) water m a m s and water services,
(e) sewer m a m s and sewer services,
(f) law enforcement,
(g) zoning,
(h) other municipal services, and
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped
peninsular land masses result withm or project into the boundaries of the
municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected
History C. 1953, 10-2-503, e n a c t e d b y L
1977, ch. 48, § 2; 1983, c h . 28, § 2, 1996, c h
132, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amend
ment effective Apul 29 1996, added t h e sub
section designations m Subsection (1) substi
tuted "The commissioners shall determine' for

'The court for the purposes oi determining
whether or not territory should be disconnected
shall consider' m Subsection (2) substituted
"In making that determination the commis
sion" for "The court" m the intioductory language, and made stylistic and related changes
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10-2-505

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

prejudiced by disconnection other than by the
loss of property taxes; disconnection would not
create islands or peninsulas which would leave

Disconnection warranted. ^
Retroactivity oi ±983 amendment.

the dty with

Disconnection w a r r a n t e d .
Disconnection of an area from the city was
warranted where the area was wholly agricultural in nature; the city did not have a municipal sewer system and it was not likely t h a t it
would acquire one; there was no municipal
water system within t h e city and no negotiations for the purchase of a water system had
occurred; there had been no municipal improvements within the area; the city had provided
minimal police and fire protection; there was an
absence of common social, economic, and geographic interests between t h e area and the cit}r;
there was no evidence t h a t the city would he

the

effect

& residua|

area that would

have

of

increasing the cost of providing
services to disproportionately high or unreasonable levels; and there was ample room for
growth and development of the city without the
area. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory,
646 P.2d 699 (Utah 1982).

R e t r o a c t i v i t y of 198S a m e n d m e n t ,
The 1983 amendment to this section, adding
the requirement of consideration of the community as a whole and adjoining owners, alters the
substantive law and does not have retroactive
application. In re Disconnection of Certain Territory, 666 R2d 544 (Utah 19S3).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 59 to 61.

10-2-504,

CoimoiMSsicmeFS* h e a r i n g amd r e p o r t ,

(1) Within 30 calendar days of their appointment, t h e commissioners shall
hold a public hearing.
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the commissioners
shall notify the parties and the public of the public hearing l\y publishing a
notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or if there
is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places
within the municipality.
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents
regarding the disconnection proposal.
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the commissioners shall report
to the court their findings and reasons regarding:
(a.) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503;
(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected
that have accrued during the time in which the territory was part of the
municipality; and
(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality -and the territory to
be disconnected.
History: C. IS'52, IO-S-504. em a c t e d by L.
1^77, ch. 48 v § 2; 1996, c h . IS2, § 4.
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1996 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the
section.

10-2-505o Court actionu
a

(1) Upon receiving t h e commissioners'report, the court may; upon request of
Party or upon its own motion,, conduct a court hearing.

348

0000002

10-2-506

UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE

(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence presented by petitioners
and the municipality regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove the viability of the
disconnection and that justice and equity require that the territory be
disconnected from the municipality by a preponderance of the evidence
(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court
shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria m
Section 10-2-503
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in
writing with findings and reasons
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 10-2-505, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, c h . 48, § 2; 1996, ch. 132, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote the
section

10-2-506. Taxes to meet m u n i c i p a l obligations.
(1) If the court orders a disconnection of territory from a municipality, the
court shall also order the county legislative body to levy taxes on the property
within the disconnected territory that may be required to pay the territory's
proportionate share of the municipal obligations accrued while the territory
was part of the municipality
(2) Any tax levy ordered by the court under Subsection (1) shall be collected
by the county treasurer in the same manner as though the disconnected
territory were a municipality
(3) The county treasurer shall pay to those entities named by the court the
revenue received from that tax levy
History: C. 1953, 10-2-506, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, c h . 48, § 2; 1993, ch. 227, § 30; 1996,
c h . 132, § 6.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added the sub
section designations, in Subsection (1) added "If

the court orders a disconnection of territory
from a municipality" and "accrued while the
territory was part of the municipality," m Sub
section (2) inserted "under Subsection (1)", and
made stylistic and related changes

NOTES TO DECISIONS
P a y m e n t of b o n d e d i n d e b t e d n e s s .
Former section vested m the court t h e power
to impose taxes to be levied on the detached
territory m propei cases, but it did not impose
an obligation to pay any portion of town's
bended indebtedness as a condition to withdiawal, at least where the commission decided

m favor of severance without imposition of
terms, and where the indebtedness for the
water and sewer system was incurred after
filing of petition for withdrawal and the sewer
system was not available to petitioner, and the
water system did not benefit the petitioner In
re Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P2d 1195 (1937)

10-2-507, Decree — Filing of documents — Notice requirements.
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy
of the order and a transparent reproducible copy of the map or plat in the
county recorder's office
(2) Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection order, the municipality shall file amended articles of incorporation m the lieutenant governor's
and county recorder's offices
344
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10-2-502.7. Court action.
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the
court shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the disconnection
proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(a) the viability of the disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality;
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements,
or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over previous
years;
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function
as a municipality; or
Si
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a
cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing
municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer
provide to the area due to the disconnection.
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to
Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of
the proposed disconnection on:
-~—(a) the municipality or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning; and
(h) other municipal services.
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with
findings and reasons.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 10 02 050207.ZIP 2,707 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|AH Titles|Leqislative Home Page
Last revised: Wednesday, October 08, 2008
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68-3-3. Retroactive effect.
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
No Change Since 1953
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 68_03_000300.ZIP 1,460 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this TitlejAII Titles|Legislative Home Page
Last revised: Wednesday, October 08, 2008
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MUNICIPAL DISCONNECTION AMENDMENTS
2003 GENERAL SESSION
STATE OF UTAH

Sponsor: Ann W. Hardy
This act modifies the Utah Municipal Code and the procedure for disconnecting territory
from a municipality. The act repeals provisions relating to the appointment of
commissioners to make findings regarding the viability of disconnection. The act
modifiesMthejcriteria for disconnection and modifies the procedure for disconnection. The
act also makes technical changes.
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
10-2-501, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996
10-2-507, as last amended by Chapter 318, Laws of Utah 2000
10-2-508, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996
RENUMBERS AND AMENDS:
10-2-502.5, (Renumbered from 10-2-504, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of
Utah 1996)
10-2-502.7, (Renumbered from 10-2-505, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of
Utah 1996)
REPEALS:
10-2-502, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996
10-2-503, as last amended by Chapter 132, Laws of Utah 1996
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 10-2-501 is amended to read:
10-2-501. Municipal disconnection — Definitions — Request for disconnection —
Requirements upon filing request.
(1) As used in this part[: (a) "County" means the county containing the municipality
from which territory is proposed to be disconnected, (b) "Municipality" means the
municipality1 containing the territory proposed for disconnection, (c) "Petitioners"]
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"petitioners" means persons [owning] who:
(a) own title to real property within the [territory within a municipality1 who propose]
area proposed for disconnection; and
fb) have signed a request for disconnection proposing to disconnect that [territory] area
from [a] the municipality.
[(d) "Territory" means that property7 within a municipality that is proposed for
disconnection.]
(2) {a} Petitioners proposing to disconnect [any territory] an area within and lying on the
borders of [any incorporated] a municipality shall file with that municipality's legislative body a
["Request for Disconnection." The Request for Disconnection] request for disconnection.
(b) Each request for disconnection shall:
[fa)] ID contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of
the real property [owners] in the [territory] area proposed for disconnection;
[ffer)] (ii) give the reasons for the proposed disconnection;
[(e)] (hi) include a map or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection; and
[(d)] (iy) designate between one and five persons with authority to act on the petitioners'
behalf in the proceedings.
(3) Upon filing the request for disconnection, petitioners shall;
(a) cause notice of the [petition] request to be published once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality^];
[(4) The municipal legislative body may respond to petitioners within 20 calendar days
after the expiration of the notice period under Subsection (3).]
[(5) (a) After the 20-day response period, petitioners may file a petition against the
municipality in district court?]
[(b) The petition shall include a copy of the Request for Disconnection.]
(b) cause notice of the request to be mailed to each owner of real property located within
the area proposed to be disconnected; and
(c) deliver a copy of the request to the legislative body of the county in which the area

-2-
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proposed for disconnection is located.
Section 2. Section 10-2-502.5, which is renumbered from Section 10-2-504 is
renumbered and amended to read:
[10-2-504].

1Q-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection — Determination by

municipal legislative body — Petition in district court.
(1) Within 30 calendar days [of their appointment] after the last publication of notice
required under Subsection 10-2-50 U3Y a), the [commissioners] legislative body of the
municipality in which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall hold a public hearing.
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the [commissioners] municipal
legislative body shall [notify the parties and the public] provide notice of the public hearing;
fa) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county in which the area
proposed for disconnection is located; and
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality
ora if there is none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places within the
municipality.
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents regarding the
disconnection proposal.
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the [commissioners] municipal legislative
body shall [report to the court their findings and reasons regarding]:
[(a) the criteria and factors provided in Section 10-2-503;]
[(b) the liabilities of the municipality and territory to be disconnected that have accrued
during the time in which the territory was part of the municipality; and]
[(c) the mutual property rights of the municipality and the territory to be disconnected.]
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an ordinance approving
disconnection of the area from the municipality.
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's
determination under Subsection (4) may be filed in district court by:

-3-
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(i) petitioners; or
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the request for
disconnection.
Section 3. Section 10-2-502.7, which is renumbered from Section 10-2-505 is
renumbered and amended to read:
[10-2-505].

10-2-502.7. Court action.

(1) [Upon receiving the commissioners1 report] After the filing of a petition under
Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the court [may] shall, upon request of a party
or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence [presented by petitioners and the
municipality] regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(a) the viability of the disconnection [and];
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality
[by a preponderance of the evidence.];
[(4) Considering all the evidence and the commissioners' report, the court shall order
disconnection if]
(c) that the proposed disconnection [satisfies the criteria in Section 10-2-503.] will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost.
requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over
previous years;
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to
function as a municipality; or
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in
a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing
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municipal services, of providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer
provide to the area due to the disconnection.
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to
Subsections (3)(c)fi) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of
the proposed disconnection on:
(a) the municipality or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning; and
(h) other municipal services.
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with
findings and reasons.
Section 4. Section 10-2-507 is amended to read:
10-2-507. Decree — Filing of documents — Notice requirements.
(1) Upon entering a disconnection order, the court shall file a certified copy of the order
and a transparent reproducible copy of the map or plat in the county recorder's office.
(2) [Within 30 calendar days of the court's disconnection order, the] The municipality
shall file amended articles of incorporation in the lieutenant governor's office, as provided in
Section 10-1-117, and the county recorder's office[:] within 30 days after, as the case may be:
(a) adoption of an ordinance approving disconnection under Subsection
10-2-502.5(4)0)): or
(b) entry of a court order under Section 10-2-502.7 ordering disconnection.
(3) The amended articles of incorporation shall:
(a) describe the postdisconnection geography of the municipality; and
(b) specify the postdisconnection population of the municipality.
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(4) The lieutenant governor shall comply with the requirements of Subsection
10-1-117(3).
[{4)] £5} Any cost incurred by the municipality in complying with this section may be
charged against the disconnected territory.
[f5)] £6} The legislative body of each municipality that has had territory disconnected
shall comply with the notice requirements of Section 10-1-116.
Section 5. Section 10-2-508 is amended to read:
10-2-508. Disconnection completed.
Disconnection is complete when the [municipality files an amendment to its articles of
incorporation] lieutenant governor certifies the amended articles of incorporation as required by
Section [10-2-507] 10-1-117.
Section 6. Repealer.
This act repeals:
Section 10-2-502, Court appointment of commissioners.
Section 10-2-503, Criteria for disconnection.

-6-
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Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C.
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
Telephone: (801) 785-5350
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853
Attorneys for Petitioners

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY

<)
)
;

FROM THE TOWN OF CEDAR HILLS <)
>

PETITION FOR
DISCONNECTION
Civil No.
Judge:

Petitioners, David and Dixie Harvey, by and through counsel, herewith allege as follows:
1.

Petitioners are .trustees to the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust and owners of the

David C. and Dixie R. Harvey Limited Liability Company, entities which own the subject
property within the town of Cedar Hills. The petitioners propose to disconnect that property
from Cedar Hills. The petitioners are identified in the request for disconnection attached as
Exhibit A.
2.

Petitioners have designated Dixie Harvey as the person with authority to act on

their behalf in these proceedings.
3.

Cedar Hills and the territory petitioners propose to disconnect is located in Utah

County, State of Utah.
4.
follows:

The territory that is proposed for disconnection is more specifically described as

Commencing at the Quarter Corner common to Sections 6 & 7 of Township 5
South, Range 2 East, S.L.B.M.; and running thence North 18.13 feet; thence
North 89°20f East 641.32 feet; thence South 0°20f East 1305.42 feet; thence
South 89°18' West 599.91 feet; thence North 0°29' West 771.55 feet; thence
North 75°06' West 39.05 feet; thence North 0°33' West 505.48 feet to the point of
beginning. Containing an area of 18.74 acres.
Also: Commencing at a point which is North 89°03' East along the Section line
690.87 feet and North 14.71 feet (North 26.03 feet & East 690.77 feet) from the
Quarter Corner common to Sections 6 & 7, Township 5 South, Range 2 East,
SX.B. M.; and running thence North 89°20' East 676.43 feet; thence South 89°58'
East 302.52 feet; thence South 0°38 East 816.72 feet; thence South 0°37' West
496.28 feet; thence South 89°36' West 822.81 feet; ttence North 0°14' West 7.50
feet; thence South 89°18' West 152.23 feet; thence North 0°20' West 1305.40 feet
to the point of beginning. Containing an area of 29.79 acres.
Less the right-of-way of Provo Reservoir Canal as at present located across the
two tracts above described. Together with 45 shares Pleasant Grove Irrigation
Company Primary Water and 10 shares of Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company
East Meadow Water. Utah County, State of Utah.
5.

On June 28, 2001, petitioners filed with the Cedar Hills City Council the Request

for Disconnection which contained;
a.

the names and signatures of more than 50% of the real property owners in

the territory proposed for disconnection;
b.

reasons for the proposed disconnection;

c.

a map of the territory proposed for disconnection; and

d.

a statement designating Dixie as a person with authority to act on behalf of

the other petitioners.
6.

Petitioners caused notice of the petition to be published once a week for three

consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality. An Affidavit of
Publication is attached as Exhibit B.
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7.

Twenty days have passed since the petitioners filed the request for disconnection.

WHEREFORE, having complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501(2)
(1996), petitioners petition the court to:
1.

appoint three disinterested persons as commissioners to make findings regarding

the viability of the disconnection proposal in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502 to 504
(1996);
2.

after receiving the commissioners' report, conduct a court hearing in accordance

with Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-505 (1996); and
3.

order disconnection of the territory from Cedar Hills.

DATED this

7

day of August 2001.
DUVAL HANSEN WITH & MORLEY, P.C.

J&C?nJl*ry^

WCC^CA7

Gordon Duval
Attorney for Petitioners

H \CLIENTS\Gordon's Clients\Harvey, DixieVenfied petition for order of disconnection wpd
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REQUEST FOR DISCONNECTION
As trustees for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust and as owners of the David C. and
Dixie R. Harvey Limited Liability Company, which combined owns the real property described
on the attached plat and as the owners of 100% of the value of the property lying partially within
the boundary of Cedar Hills, Utah, we ask to have the property disconnected from Cedar Hills,
Utah, in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 10-2-501.
We request this disconnection because Cedar Hills has proved unwilling to work with us
in our attempts to use the property according to our rights as property owners. While we were
out of the state on a religious assignment from 1994 to 1997, Cedar Hills annexed and designated
our property as the future location of a city park and zoned the property public facility. This was
essentially a taking of our property as it rendered our property useless for any type of residential
use. Since our return in 1997. we have repeatedly attempted to remedy the situation b\ meeting
with city planners and attending various meetings with city officials. We indicated our
willingness to sell a nine acre portion of our property to the city for a city park in exchange for
residential zoning of the remaining 15 acres, but the city refused our offer. As such, the property
is still zoned public facility. We have never received any compensation from the city for the
beneficial use of our property that we have been denied because of the public facility zoning.
The city has failed to reach any reasonable solution and refuses to rezone the property.
Consequently, we request that the property be disconnected from Cedar Hills.
Furthermore, a disconnection would enable us to reunite all of our property under a single
city government. The property was separated when Cedar Hills annexed part of it and left the
remainder in Pleasant Grove. The two properties are plats 36 and 40 as depicted on Utah County
Plat NE section 7, township 5 south, range 2 east. The northern portion of each of these plats lies
within the borders of Cedar Hills, and the southern portion of each of these plats lies within the
borders of Pleasant Grove. By approving the proposed disconnection, the plats will be united as
they once were under a single city government and taxing unit.
We hereby designate Dixie and David Harvey of 2806 North 1450 West, Cedar Hills,
Utah, and Gordon Duval of DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY as the individuals with
authority to act on our behalf in this request for disconnection proceeding.
Dated this ]J^> of June 2001.

*

Dixie Harvey

/

Trustee for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust
Member of David R. and Dixie R. Harvey L.L.P.

David Harvey
Trustee for the David C. Harvey Revocable Trust
Member of David R. and Dixie R. Harvey L.L.P.
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PROOF OF PUBLICATION
from

The Daily Herald
STATE
Utah

OF

UTAH

County

1

SS
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NOTICE
NOTICE is hereby given that the owners of the approximate area of 9200 North Utah County Road, (parcels
36 and 40 as depicted on Utah County Plat NE section
7, township 5 south, range 2 east), are requesting disconnection from the town of Cedar Hills The property
consists of approximately 25 acres.
Copies of the proposed Request for Disconnection are
filed in the Cedar Hills City Office, 44393 West Cedar
Hills Dnve, Cedar Hills, Utah.
Published in The Daily Herald July 2, 9, and 16, 2001
Legal Notice #506132 Published in The Daily Herald
July 2, 9, 16, 2001.

I, Konnie Lynn Davis, being first duly
sworn depose and say that I am the
Legal Billing Clerk of the Daily
Herald, a newspaper of general
circulation, published seven times each
week at Provo, Utah, County of Utah;
that: the notice attached hereto,
#506132 Notice is hereby given, and
which is a copy, was published in said
newspaper , the first publication
having been made on the 2nd day of
July, 2001, and the last on the 16th
day of July, 2 001; that said notice was
published in the regular and entire
issue of every number of the paper
during the period and times of
publication, and the same was published
in the newspaper proper and^jopt in the
supplement.

Subscribed and sworn before me
this 18th day of July, 2001

cz^Jt

Notary7 Public

Residence: Eagle Mountain, Utah
My commission expires February 5, 2 005

r
.LISA DANETTE STONc
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Gordon Duval, Bar No 6532
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C
947 South 500 East, Suite 200
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone (801) 763-0155
Facsimile (801) 763-8379
Attorney for Harvey's

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
J25Noith J 00 West Piovo Utah 8460J

CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID C. HARVEY, et al.
Defendants,

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO DETERMINE
APPROPRIATE STATUTORY
STANDARD

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY
FROM THE CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,
DA WD and DIXIE HARVEY, individually
and as trustees,

faijp Nos 01-040404*?
01-0403694
01-0404044

Plaintiffs,
Judge James Taylor

v.
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,
Defendants.

David and Dixie Harvey respectfully move pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, that the Court enter an order of Partial Summary Judgement indicating that the

0000021

2001 Municipal Disconnection statute (§ 10-2-501 et seq. (2001)) is the applicable law in this
case. This motion is based upon the following:
1.

This disconnection action was commenced in 2001.

2.

The law governing municipal disconnections at the date this action was commenced was

3.

In 2003, the Utah Legislature enacted amendments to the disconnection statute which
changed the substantive rights of the parties involved in a disconnection action.

4.

Because the disconnection statutes are substantive in nature, the applicable statute is the
one in effect at the time the disconnection is filed.

5.

Utah Code section 68-3-3 states that "no part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so stated." Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-3 (2004).

6.

The 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute are not expressly retroactive.

Respectfully submitted, this

"^®

day of September, 2007.

DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C.

GORDON/ftUVAL
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Gordon Duval, Bar No. 6532
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C.
947 South 500 East, Suite 200
American Fork, UT 84003
Telephone (801) 763-0155
Facsimile (801) 763-8379
Attorney for Harveys

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 North J 00 West, Provo, Utah S4601

CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

HARVEYS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR CROSS-MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DAVID C. HARVEY, er. al.
Defendants,
IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY
FROM THE CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,

CaseNos. 01-0404045
01-040S694

DAVID and DIXIE HARVEY, individually
and as trustees,
Plaintiffs,

01-0404044

Judge James Taylor

v.
CITY OF CEDAR HILLS,
Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Harveys respectfully
submit this reply memorandum m support of their cross-motion for partial summary judgment.
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ARGUMENT
It appears from the City of Cedar Hills' Memorandum in Opposition to the Harveys'
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment that the parties are in agreement with respect to many of
the factors at issue before the court in this discomiection matter. Specifically, the parties agree
that; (a) the Harveys have the right to proceed with their disconnection; (b) the applicable
statutory standard for the disconnection matter is the 2001 version of the disconnection siatute;
and (c) the evidence allowed at the disconnection hearing should be limited to those criteria
specifically addressed in the disconnection statute.
A.

The Disconnection Action May Proceed
The Harveys acknowledge that this court has already ruled that their disconnection

action may proceed. (Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2007). As such, the Harveys
withdraw their request that the court affirmatively rule that the facts stated in the motion
constitute "changed and unusual circumstances."
B.

Applicable Statutory Standard is the 2001 Statute
In 2001, the Harveys filed their disconnection petition with this court. The statute in

effect at the time the petition was filed called upon the court to appoint impartial
commissioners to hold a public hearing, make findings and prepare a report based on those
findings. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-502, 503, 504 (2001). This code section also contained
very specific criteria for disconnection, as follows:
(1) The commissioners shall determine whether or not disconnection will leave the
municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements,
or other burdens of municipal sendees would materially increase over previous years or

-' u Li 0 u

for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a
municipality.
(2) in making that determination, the commissioners shah consider all relevant factors
including the effect of the disconnection on:
(a) the city or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water sendees;
(e) sewer mains and sewer sendees;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning;
(h) other municipal services; and
(i) whether or not islands or unreasonably large and varied-shaped peninsular land
masses result within the project in to the boundaries of the municipality from which
the territory is to be disconnected. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-503 (2001).

The 2001 version of the statute also mandates that the court shall order disconnection if
the proposed disconnection satisfies the criteria in section 10-2-503. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2505(4) (2001).
In 2003, the state legislature repealed sections 10-2-502 and 10-2-503 of the Utah Code
and amended the disconnection statute. These amendments eliminated the impartial
commissioners from the disconnection process. The amended section provided for the local
legislative body to preside over the public hearing process. Id. at § 10-2-502.5. Most
significantly, the amended statute makes additions to and modifies the criteria in hearings for
disconnection. Id. at § 10-2-502.7. For example, section 10-2-502.7(d) requires the petitioner
to prove that the county will be capable of providing sendees that will no longer be provided by
the city. This subsection adds a completely new factor that the petitioner must prove.

0000025

Generally, legislation is not given retroactive effect. Utah Code section 68-3-3
codifies this principle, stating that "no part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless
expressly so stated." UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 68-3-3 (2004). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that, "as a general rule, 'retroactivity is not favored in the law.'" Goebel v. Salt Lake
dry S. R.R. Co. ,104 P.3d 1185 (2004) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204,208(1988)).
The Utah Supreme Coun has ruled that where statutory amendments governing
disconnection create new factors the district court must consider in making its decision, that
such amendments alter the substantive law. In Re Disconnection of Certain Territory from
Highland, 668 P.2d 544, 548-49 (Utah 1983.) Because the disconnection statutes are
substantive in nature, the applicable statute is the one in effect at the time the disconnection is
filed.
Based upon the fact that the City of Cedar Hills has cited to the 2001 version of the
disconnection statute throughout their memorandum, the parties appear to be in agreement that
the 2001 statute is applicable in this case. As such, the Harveys have prepared a motion on this
matter which is being filed concurrently with this reply.

C. Evidence Relating to the Annexation Process Should be Limited
The City of Cedar Hills spends considerable effort in their memorandum in
opposition to this motion to persuade the court to limit the scope of the evidence presented at
the disconnection hearing. The City argues that the Coun is not required, or even permitted, to
-4-
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consider any evidence relating to the annexation, but rather the Court must limit its inquiry to
the specific criteria set forth in the statute. The Harveys do not dispute this argument.
The 2001 version of the disconnection statute sets forth specific factors to be considered
b3r the commissioners and the court in determining the viability and appropriateness of
disconnection. See UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 10-2-503 (2001). Ultimately, the decision of the court

must rest solely upon these factors as mandated by the language of section 10-2-505(4) which
states that the court shall order disconnection if the proposed disconnection satisfies the cnteria
in section 10-2-503.
In the present case, there has been much discussion about the procedural defects in the
annexation process as well as agreements that were supposedly entered into at the time of
annexation or as a condition of annexation. For purposes of the disconnection matter, none of
this evidence is relevant. The evidence and arguments should be restricted to the present status
of the property and the city. Any past transactions between the parties are irrelevant to the
determination of the viability of the disconnection. Specifically, the City of Cedar Hills should
not be permitted to present evidence or argue that the Harvey property was designated as park
land as part of a larger annexation and zoning agreement. The Harveys should not be pemiittcd
to present evidence of procedural defects in the annexation.
The Harveys have prepared a motion in limine which is being filed concurrently with
this reply.

-5-
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CONCLUSION
This Court has previously determined that the Harveys' disconnection action may
proceed. (Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2007). With respect to the remaining issues
addressed by the parties on this motion, the parties appear to be in agreement on the issues of
the applicable statutory standard and the limitation of evidence related to the annexation
process. The Harveys have submitted motions related to these issues concurrently with this
reply memorandum for the Court's consideration.
DATED this j 2 p

day of September, 2007.

DUVAL HAWS & MOODY. P.C.

GORDONS UVAL
Attorney for* laintiff
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1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(April 4, 2008)

3

THE JUDGE:

This

4

THE CLERK:

It's in there.

5

THE JUDGE:

It's in there.

6

THE CLERK:

It's down on the bottom shelf.

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

All right.
9

where we are.

is Harvey versus Cedar Hills.

It's in t h e —

I, I've reviewed the pleadings, I know

So who wants to be heard?

10

MR. DUVAL:

I'll be heard in the matter.

1 1

THE JUDGE:

All right.

ARGUMENT BY MR. DUVAL

12

MR. DUVAL:

13

Three motions pending, Your Honor.

14

Maybe I can address the statutory one because I believe that

15

explains why the other motions may or may not be necessary.
We believe that the, as you may remember this case

16
17

was filed in 2001 under a certain set of procedural rules.

18

Legislation was changed in 2003 with a new, a few framework

19

in place.

20

98 specifically says in its heading it modifies the criteria

21

for disconnect.

As a matter of fact it was the new House Bill a,

I have a c o p y —

THE JUDGE:

22

Yes.

This whole case is like quantum

23

physics because everybody, everything keeps moving.

They're

24

in, they're out, the law is this, the law is that.

Go

25

ahead.
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MR. DUVAL:
2

Yes.

And if I may just provide a copy

to the court—

3

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

4

MR. DUVAL:

—

5

THE JUDGE:

Thanks.

6

rule.

of that rule.
This is the, this is the new

Right?
MR. DUVAL:

This is the one that was passed in

9

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

10

MR. DUVAL:

And it clearly says in the heading

7
8

2003.

1 1 that it modifies the criteria for disconnection, which I
12

believe is substantive, which means that it should, that it

13

wouldn't apply to the case.

14

procedure for disconnection we cited, both sides have cited

15

to the court the cases that say the procedure can be

16

modified.

17

actually intense.

18

As a matter of fact, as I reviewed it it seems like the 2001

19

and the 2003 statutes are a, due, turn on the head the

20

criteria that are to be applied.

21
22
23

To the extent it modifies the

But as you look through this the changes are
Especially as it relates to criteria.

I have copies of the 2001 statute.

May I approach

with that, Your Honor, just so you can see that?
If I can just explain.

The 2001 statute lists at

24

section 503 the criteria for disconnection, that's two

25

subsets down there.

The one is just to determine whether
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1

the disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual

2

area within its boundaries which essentially makes it

3

economically or practically unreasonable to administer.

4

the second sets forth the criteria, subsection (2).

And

And then if you go over to the next page section

5
6

505 which talks about the court action, and that's where

7

we're involved now, then you see I underlined there

8

subsection (4) where it says, after considering the evidence

9

and the commissioners and the court, the court shall order

10

disconnection if the proposed connection satisfies the

11

criteria in that section.

12

criteria.

13

you're supposed to look at these criteria, and if you find

14

he's satisfied these criteria then you shall order

15

disconnection.

how it modifies that significantly.
The 2003 statute now has the criteria in section

18
19

It really says, Judge, this is where you're,

And then if I may approach with the 2003 statute

16
17

So it really enthrones that

502.7.

20

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

21

MR. DUVAL:

And it's subsect ion (4) is where those

22

criteria are listed.

23

heading of subsection (4) it says,

But look how it's done that.

24

In determining whether petitioners have

25

met their burden of proof with respect to

In the
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1
Two of them.

2

Then you consider those relevant

3

factors.

And so it almost makes it like they're, they're

4

just, oh, by the way these are things you're suppose to

5

consider, these are some of the things to consider in the

6

other t w o —
THE JUDGE:

7
8

consider.

9

it?

I don't think it's an oh, by the way deal, is

MR. DUVAL:

10

Well, it says the court shall

No.

But it highlights in essence the

11

other two criteria which are stated above.

12

changes the criteria how you proceed.

13

impacts how we present our case.

So I think it

And I think it

14

THE JUDGE:

Well, these seven are the same.

15

MR. DUVAL:

The seven, no, the seven are the same,

17

THE JUDGE:

(a) through (h).

18

MR. DUVAL:

(a) through (h), correct, yes.

19

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

16

20
21

yes—

And the other... And I then I

consider whether they have met their burden of proof.
MR. DUVAL:

Right.

But, but the difference is in

22

the 2001 statute you have a, the, the number of subsection

23

(1) which is also a criteria.

24

another a standard that has to be considered as well.

25

THE JUDGE:

That's the standard there,

Well, let's make sure I follow you
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1

here.

The 2001 version.

2

MR. DUVAL:

503.

3

THE JUDGE:

503 has subsection (1) which talks

4

about what the commissioners decide.

5

MR. DUVAL:

Right, right.

6

THE JUDGE:

And it seems to me that that would

7

correspond to subsection (3), (3) isn't it, of 502.7 in the

8

new act?

9

MR. DUVAL:

But you see it's rewritten entirely

11

THE JUDGE:

It is.

12

MR. DUVAL:

—

13

to avoid all that confusion—

10

and i t —

14

THE JUDGE:

15

is what has changed.

16

MR. DUVAL:

and it changes.

And so that's why

Well, and what I'm trying to focus on

It changes, it changes talking about

17

the viability, it changes talking about whether or not the

18

municipality will leave, will have an area within its

19

boundaries for which the cost requirements a, or other burden

20

of providing municipal services would—

21

THE JUDGE:

Well, sub (ii), subsection (c)(ii) is

22

the same, and (c)(iii) I think is probably the same. Maybe

23

not.

24

(i), (ii), and (iii) all appear to be kind of a restatement

25

of subsection (1) to the middle of 503, aren't they?

That's consistent with case law though.

You know,
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MR. DUVAL:

1

They're similar, Your Honor.

But

2

that's the point is the fact that we have to compare.

3

just think to get into hearing we should apply the law that

4

was in effect at the time the disconnection was filed.

5

believe that 2001 statute i s —

6

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

7

MR. DUVAL:

—

8

THE JUDGE:

You say '01 applies because the '03

9

We

We

is the relevant one.

statute was applied after the case was filed.

10

MR. DUVAL:

Correct.

11

THE JUDGE:

Because these changes in your view are

12

substantive, not procedural.
MR. DUVAL:

13

Correct.

It changes how you're

14

supposed to analyze them and, and consider the various

15

evidence that's presented.

16

case, Your Honor.

17

THE JUDGE:

It impacts how we present the

Well, it's important for me to know

18

then how are they materially different.

19

that.

20

just a restatement of the rule then it doesn't matter.

21
22

Let's focus on

If there really isn't a difference, if it really is

MR. DUVAL:

It probably it is a restatement,

Your Honor, because I believe it changes—

23

THE JUDGE:

How is it different?

24

MR. DUVAL:

—

25

it changes, you'll see here now

that justice in eguity is one of the, is before it was like
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1

a, it's not even mentioned as a criteria.

2
3

It didn't do justice or equity

MR. DUVAL:

It was not, not a criteria.

before?

4
5

THE JUDGE:

It was

just, it w a s —

6

THE JUDGE:

That's what courts do.

MR. DUVAL:

Right.

Your Honor.

I understand that,

But, but I believe it's necessary because it

relates to the next question about what evidence is going to
10

be admitted and when and how that would be, come before the

11

court.

12

as part of the criteria, it's not identified.

13

Justice in equity is not considered in section 2001

THE JUDGE:

It's a characterization of the

It's not...

How could I, how could I do anything

14

process.

15

if I'm not doing justice or doing equity.

16

the substantive difference between these two sections on this

17

area, counsel.

18

seeing, I'm not seeing that the substantive law has

19

changed.

20

not the question before us.

21

the procedure.

I don't understand

You really need to explain to me.

Clearly the procedure is different.

I'm not

But that's

A change of procedure we follow

22

MR. DUVAL:

Subsection (3)(c)(iii)—

23

THE JUDGE:

All right.

24

MR. DUVAL:

—

25

THE JUDGE:

Leave or create one or more

is new.
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1

islands or peninsulas of unincorporated

2

territory.

3

Is that an issue in this case?

4

MR. DUVAL:

Could be, Your Honor.

5

THE JUDGE:

What about a, (2)(i) in the old

6

statute?

7

masses.

9

Islands or reasonably large or peninsular land
Isn't that the same the same thing?
MR. DUVAL:

8

Yes.

No.

It's not, Your Honor.

you can have those irregular shaped peninsulas.

Because

Whether or

10

not it's a, whether or not it's unincorporated is a relevant

11

factor in this case, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

12
13

island.

Well, we're not talking about an

Correct?

14

MR. DUVAL:

Correct.

15

THE JUDGE:

We're talking about a peninsula.

16
17

the old statute says,
Unreasonably large or varied shaped

18

peninsula land masses.

19

That's something to be considered.

20

And

And the new

statute says, well, if it creates—

21

MR. DUVAL:

Can't have that.

22

THE JUDGE:

Can't have them at all.

23

MR. DUVAL:

Right.

Very very important in this

24

case, Your Honor.

Because when it's disconnected it will be

25

temporarily unincorporated territory until it is annexed into
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Pleasant Grove.
THE JUDGE:

2
3

So my recollection this is a property

that's right on the border.
MR. DUVAL:

4

Correct.

And it's Harveys intention

5

to go into Pleasant Grove immediately upon disconnection.

6

So that's a substantive—
THE JUDGE:

7

Isn't there a procedure for cities to

8

dispute,

I mean, if this were Pleasant Grove against a

9

Highland, or, is it Highland?

Yes.

If the cities wanted to

10

change the boundary there's an a separate procedure for doing

11

that.

Right?
MR. DUVAL:

12

There's a way to do it agreeably and

13

disagreeably.

They can do a boundary, boundary annexation

14

or change of boundaries b y —

15

THE JUDGE:

There's a procedure—

16

MR. DUVAL:

—

by agreement.

17

THE JUDGE:

—

for the city to battle out—

18

MR. DUVAL:

Correct.

19

THE JUDGE:

—

20

MR. DUVAL:

Correct.

ownership of territory.
So that's why, Your Honor,

21

we believe the 2001 statute is the one that it applies. We

22

believe there are substantive differences here that impact my

23

client's right—
THE JUDGE:

24
25

do that?

Why shouldn't I require the cities to

If this is, if this is two completely incorporated

0000039
PAGE 11

areas abutting each other, I don't have any county area in
2

the middle, no greenbelt, why shouldn't I require that the

3

cities battle this out?

4

property into Pleasant Grove, why shouldn't Pleasant Grove

5

petition and take on Highland and have the discussion.

6

why should, why should we allow a private landowner to

7

essentially create a little area of county and then make that

8

election?

9
10

MR. DUVAL:

If Pleasant Grove wants to take this

Why,

That procedure contemplates that the

city of Pleasant Grove could have objected to the

1 1 disconnection.

That's the reason for public hearing to allow

1 2 all interested parties to have input and say so.

But it's a

13

right of the property owner, it's not just a right of

14

neighboring cities.

So there's two, two separate interests

1 5 to be protected there.

There's no doubt that Pleasant Grove

16

does have an interest in the outcome, but there's also no

17

doubt that the Harveys have an interest.

18

pursue that independently.

19

THE JUDGE:

And so they can

So the first of your, of the motion

20

that you're addressing right now is your argument that the

21

new law is a, is a substantive change and therefore I should

22

apply the old statute, not the new statute.

23

MR. DUVAL:

That is correct, Your Honor.

24

THE JUDGE:

All right.

25

Do you want to speak to

that, counsel?
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ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON

1
2

MR. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, the, the motions that

3

are before you I don't have some of the background.

4

can approach and just hand you a map.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

what we're looking at.
THE JUDGE:

8

If I

Sure.
Just to refresh your memory of, of

The thing that sticks out in my memory

9

most from this is that the first decision I rendered I blew

10

it because I assumed that they were living on the property,

11

and I found out they weren't and changed my mind.

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

THE JUDGE:

14
15

mind.

Okay.

Yes.

I don't do that very often, change my

My wife will tell you.
MR. JOHNSON:

And a, what it is, the parcel that

16

is being petitioned to disconnect is this approximate 12, 13

17

acres in white.

There's—

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

Yes.

And there's white right next

to it which a, is, is an elementary school.

21

THE JUDGE:

22

MR. JOHNSON:

23

South of Harvey Boulevard?

Okay.
And then the homes around it and

those two white parcels is what was annexed back in 1997.

24

THE JUDGE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

All right.
The Murdock Canal is just to the
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1

south of this.

2

THE JUDGE:

3

MR. JOHNSON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And then the David and Dixie

4

Harvey actually own this land on the other side of Murdock

5

Canal—

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

8

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

and a, have been farming that

for many years.
THE JUDGE:

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

All right.
And that's over there.

This is, is

1 1 now Pleasant Grove city to the east of the subject parcel.
1 2 And so just, I just wanted to have that for you to refresh
13

your memory.

And, and I'll, I'll turn t o —

14

THE JUDGE:

Looking...

15

it may or may not be relevant.

16

map.

Just one more question and

I'm looking at the, at the

And I look at 900 West it says Pleasant Grove, that

1 7 street.
18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

THE JUDGE:

20

Harvey property.

Yes.
I see immediately to the east of the

Now that's Pleasant Grove t o o —

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Yes, it's kind of shaded.
Yes.
Yes.
What about farther north—
Yes.
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THE JUDGE:
2
3
4

across Harvey Boulevard?

Is that

also Pleasant Grove?
MR. JOHNSON:

Yes.

There's quite a checker board

there, Your Honor.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

—

Yes.
And, and this goes to the question

you were asking Mr. DuVal about the cities—

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

THE JUDGE:

11

MR. JOHNSON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

doing a boundary adjustment.

Yes.
The respective city councils have

12

considered that over the last several years, and they looked

13

at it very carefully within the last year.

14

THE JUDGE:

15

MR. JOHNSON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And a, which is one of the reasons

16

that although this, these are all of the motions of the

17

Harveys, Cedar Hills did not push for these to be decided

18

sooner because there was perhaps a legislative resolution—

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

Okay.
Well, not perhaps.

There was a

legislative resolution—

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

Being considered.
—

being worked out that the two

24

communities because there's this checker board north of the

25

Murdock C a n a l —
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THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

they were, they were saying okay

let's, let's rework this, let's figure out a better line and
it will help provide city services better, so forth and so
on.
And the outcome of that, Your Honor, was that a,
that the cities called the public hearing, they invited input
from the public.

And the people in Pleasant Grove said we

don't want to be in Cedar Hills, and the people in Cedar
Hills said we don't want to be in Pleasant Grove and so there
was no line.
THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:

Everybody except the Harveys.
That's right.

That's right.

All right.
And so t h a t ' s —
All right.
—

so that was looked at and, and

rejected—
THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE JUDGE:

Okay.
—

based on public feedback.

So we're, we're down to now it's

these two parcels south of Harvey Boulevard.

And when I say

two—
MR. JOHNSON:

At this point it's just one because

the, the other is now a school—
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THE JUDGE:

1
2

The school, the school

is to the east or the west?
MR. JOHNSON:

3
4

Show me again.

an X.

Yes.

This white area, let me draw

This is the parcel in discussion.

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.
A school has been built right there,

7

the Harveys no longer own it.

8

THE JUDGE:

9

MR. JOHNSON:

All right.
When this was originally annexed in

10

there was about 25 acres that was zoned public facilities, it

11

was Cedar Hills City hope that it would all be a park.

12

THE JUDGE:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

Okay.
But approximately 13 of that has

been built into an elementary school.

15

THE JUDGE:

16

in yellow the Harvey property.

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. DUVAL:

21

THE JUDGE:

23

So I've, I've highlighted

Is that accurate?

Yes.
And that's the property, that's the

property that's in question.

20

22

All right.

Do you agree?

Yes.
All right.

Thank you.

All right.

Let's go ahead.
MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

Now turning to the, the

24

differences between the 2001 and 2003 statutes it's the

25

position of the city of Cedar Hills that because the
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1

procedures from the 2003 statute were used to get to this

2

point before the court that that's the statute that should

3

apply.

4

difference.

However, we don't see that it makes a real
Under the 2001 statute under 10-2-503(2).

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
It says that all relevant factors

7

should be looked at including.

8

That isn't a mutually exclusive list.

9
10

THE JUDGE:
MR. JOHNSON:

And then it gives a list.

Uh-huh (affirmative).
That's just a list that says make

11

sure you don't forget these things.

12

that can be looked at that are also relevant factors.

13

relevant things would be everything that is included in the

14

2003 statute.

15

THE JUDGE:

There are other things
Those

Well, there was one area that counsel

16

pointed out that I think is, is hard to reconcile between the

17

two and that the peninsular or peninsula argument, the '03

18

version seems to say that the proposed reading, this is

19

subsection (c), 501(2).7b, sub (c) says,

20
21

the proposed disconnection will not:
Then (3).

22

Leave or create one more islands or

23

peninsulas of unincorporated territory.

24

I mean it's not, that isn't something for me to

25

think about, it says that I have to find that it will not
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leave a peninsula.

Under the old statute it simply says

2

taken as you say, consider among other things whether or not

3

there will be a peninsula.

4

difference.

5

peninsula I can't approve it.

6

can take that into account, but in consideration of all of

7

the other factors I may still approve it.

That, that seems to be kind of a

In the one sense it's mandatory if there's a
In the other statute it says I

That seems to be

quite a difference.
MR. JOHNSON:
10

What I'm saying is you're going to

be looking at the exact same factors.
THE JUDGE:

11

Okay.

Well, it's undisputed here that if I

12

disconnect this property there's going to be an

13

unincorporated area in the middle that's not connected to any

14

other unincorporated property.
MR. JOHNSON:

15

Right.

And as I understand what

16

you're saying there aren't different factors, it's the same,

17

what's relevant—

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

THE JUDGE:

22

MR. JOHNSON:

24
25

—

sense—

is the same, it's, it's you're

saying—

21

23

In the one

The weight.
—

it seems 2003 requires me to put

a stiffer weight o n —
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

I don't have any discretion at

all it sounds like under the 2003 statute, it says if it
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1

leaves an island of unincorporated territory I can't approve

2

it.
MR. JOHNSON:

3
4

court judges have taken that exact position.
THE JUDGE:

5
6

Yes.

And that seems to be a, a

substantial departure from the 503 statute, isn't it?
MR. JOHNSON:

7
8

And I believe that other district

It, it is a change.

It's not a

change in what evidence you will look at.
THE JUDGE:

9

Yes.

MR. JOHNSON:

10

But it is a change in the weight you

1 1 would put upon it, yes.
THE JUDGE:

12

And, and it's critical for this case

13

because, I mean there, the facts are undisputed.

14

this, this little yellow spot on this map here right here is

15

completely surrounded by incorporated territory, that's an

16

island.

17

if I follow the, the standard in, in from the '01 statute

18

it's something I take into account but it isn't

19

determinative.

20
21

And a under '03 I've got to say denied.

If I grant

And if I,

Is that...

MR. JOHNSON:

I would submit that it would be

reversible error way.

22

THE JUDGE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Great.
Under either statute.
Okay.
I would submit under either statute
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1

that it would be reversible error to leave an

2

island of the county surrounded by municipalities.

3
4
5

THE JUDGE:

Oh,

unincorporated

so you think that even if I

applied the '01 section it doesn't matter.
MR. JOHNSON:

That's right.

That's right.

6

That, that it would a, you have to consider that factor in

7

that the weight that you should give it would be, I think

8

we're informed in 2003 substantially the same even under

9

the '01 statute and you should arrive at the same

10
11
12

conclusion.
THE JUDGE:

conclusion with regard to, to the unincorporated island?

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

THE JUDGE:

15

Is there a case that makes that

I'm not sure I follow the question.
Well, what I'm saying is the language

in the '03 a c t —

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

is very plain, the statutory

18

language is very plain, the court shall not approve it if

19

there is an island.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).
The language in the '01 act or the '01

22

statute, in making that determination the commissioners shall

23

consider relevant factors including whether islands result.

24

That just makes it a relevant factor, that doesn't make it a

25

dispositive factor.
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1

MR. JOHNSON:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.
That's what I'm saying.
If I follow what the question is,

4

was that tweeking of the statutory language, was that based

5

on a case.

6

THE JUDGE:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

8

THE JUDGE:

9
10

Yes.
Not that I know of.
Okay.

All right.

But your point,

what you're telling me, what I hear you saying is that
because the '01 statute doesn't even talk about going to the

1 1 court.

The fact that we're here procedurally in court I

12

have to apply the statute that creates the court procedure

13

which is the '03 statute.

14
15

MR. JOHNSON:
followed to get us here.

16

THE JUDGE:

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

THE JUDGE:

19
20

That's the procedure that was

Yes.
Yes.

That's our position.

So I can't, I can't do half of one and

half of the other.
MR. JOHNSON:

It's awkward.

But I submit again,

21

Your Honor, I submit that even if you were to move forward

22

under the '01 a c t —

23

THE JUDGE:

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

Uh-huh (affirmative).
—

that fairness and justice would

require you to come to the same conclusions you would come to
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1

under the '03 act because you are to consider all relevant

2

factors.

3
4

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. DUVAL

5

MR. DUVAL:

Just one point, Your Honor.

6

think it's completely correct.

7

at subsection 505(2).

I don't

The 2001 statute if you look

8

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

9

MR. DUVAL:

We're in the same point, the same

10

hearing, the same, same examination that occurs, because

11

at the hearing the court shall hear evidence presented by

12

petitioners and the municipality regarding the viability.

13

And so the only difference was whether we had a three member

14

panel that heard it earlier or whether we had the city

15

council that heard it earlier, we still end up at this court

16

to review the, the fact before and to make these

17

determinations.

18

And so we've used the 2001 and the 2003 statute

19

both envision that we're going to be before this court with

20

an evidentiary hearing to analyze these issues.

21

criteria that we're looking at that has changed and that's

22

why we believe that the 2001 statute is appropriate.

23

It's the

FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON

24

MR. JOHNSON:

If I may briefly, Your Honor.

25

The criteria that the Cedar Hills city council
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1

looked at that get us to this point was the 2003 act, not the

2

2001 act.

3

proceed under the same criteria that got us here.

4

the rule that they applied.

5

And that, that's why we're saying we need to

THE JUDGE:

Well, I think I have to apply the rule

6

that applies.

7

the wrong statute that's, that's an issue for them.

Not...

That's

If they made a mistake and considered
But

that's neither here nor there.
Counsel, as I read, I think a plain reading of the
10

2001 statute subsection 503(2)(i) I think, I think he's

1 1 right.

I don't think that the 2003 statute made a material

12

difference.

13

plainly, not plainly, what was intended by the old 503 and

14

that is that I think the only way I can read 10-2-503 from

15

the 2001 statute is to read that if a disconnect would leave

16

an unincorporated island that that is a basis or a reason to

17

deny, that that is dispositive.

18

dispositive then and I think that's dispositive now.

19

I don't think there's a material difference between the two

20

statutes on that point.

21

I think it simply made it more explicit what was

MR. DUVAL:

And I think it was
So I,

I don't understand, Your Honor,

22

because I don't know that, there's no case law cited to the

23

effect, it's just one of the many factors to consider.

24

there are, are numerous situations in this place where there

25

are unincorporated parts of the town within, with

And
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Your Honor.
2

THE JUDGE:

3

to hear on this?

4

the case?

5

Do we have other motions that I need

Is that dispositive?

MR. DUVAL:

Does that decide

If the court's ruling is that the 20 01

6

statute would not allow an island to be created, then I

7

believe that would be dispositive, Your Honor.

8
9

THE JUDGE:
it.

That's how I see it, that's how I see

Do you want to draw up a ruling to that effect.

And a,

10

well, I can certify that as final and if you need to take it

11

up on appeal you can.

12
13

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

And so, just to make sure

I'm following—

14

COURT'S RULING

15

THE JUDGE:

Let me, let me state it again as

16

carefully as I can and then you can state it back to me to

17

make sure we're understanding.

18

me today is whether the court should proceed under the

19

substantive provisions of the 2001 statute or the 2003

20

statute because this case was filed when the 2001 statute

21

was in effect and the 2003 statute was enacted thereafter.

22

The question that's before

So the question for me is whether the change in the

23

law is substantive or procedural.

24

apply the procedure that's in place when I conduct the

25

hearing.

If it is procedural we

If it's substantive we apply the law of substance
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at the time the case is filed, not at the time the case, the
2

hearing is conducted.
I've carefully compared the statute from 2001 and

3
4

the statute from 2003.

I'm satisfied that the relevant

5

criteria that is whether or not the disconnection will leave

6

an island of unincorporated territory, which is plainly

7

dispositive under the 2003 statute, was a relevant, first of

8

all it was certainly a relevant matter under the 2001

9

statute.

But I think it's more than that, I think it was

10

also dispositive under the 2001 statute.

Because I think

11

the, the only way I can read 10-2-503(2)(i) of the 2001

12

statute is that the court should deny the, the petition to

13

disincorporate if it would leave an island of unincorporated

14

territory.

15

the law it doesn't change the law.

So I think that while the 2003 statute restates

16

But the problem is that the, the factor which is

17

now very plainly in the '03 statute was present in the '01

18

statute and, therefore, the city is entitled to judgment as a

19

matter of law on that point.

20

If the court of appeals chooses to reverse me they

21

reverse me.

It's an interesting question.

There isn't case

22

law directly on point.

23

implies that the, the policy of the court should be to avoid

24

islands of annexation.

25

503 in the 2001 statute it's not stated in such a way that I

I think the case law that's available

And it's not stated, it's not under
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1

may have a discretion to consider that as a part of the

2

totality.

3

intended (inaudible word) to disincorporation.

I think that's a, I think that's written and

MR. JOHNSON:

4

That is the city's position,

5

Your Honor.

6

dispositive motion on that, we were waiting for the ruling

7

from the court today.

8

prepared to s i g n —
THE JUDGE:

9
10

And a, we, we had not formally filed a

Well, I'm there and prepared to sign

an order.

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

THE JUDGE:

13

What I'm hearing is that you would be

prepare a motion.

Okay.
We can jump through the hoops and

But the facts are not in dispute.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

No, I don't believe they are.
This property is surrounded by

16

incorporated property.

17

wrong and we'll consider all of the other factors.

18

view is sustained there is no point in taking additional

19

evidence and dragging this out father.

20
21

MR. JOHNSON:

That point in law, if I'm wrong E'm
But if my

Well, I'll prepare an order to that

effect, Your Honor.

22

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Great.

23

MR. DUVAL:

Just a quick question, Your Honor.

To

24

the extent we could expedite that we would like to have a

25

stay so we can have a review from the courts so the property

0000057
PAGE 29

is not taken in the interim.
2

MR. JOHNSON:

The city would, as you may recall

3

there is a companion case for condemnation and the city is

4

willing to agree to not move forward on that case until the

5

appeal h a s —

6

THE JUDGE:

And it certainly is an appealable

7

question, and I would absolutely be willing to sign an order

8

to that effect because I think it's an interesting question

9

that hasn't been addressed.

10

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

There's also the companion

11

claim against the city on the constitutional rights that I'm

12

defending the city on.

13

until we finish the appeal.

Are we going to leave that on hold

14

THE JUDGE:

Do you want to do that?

15

MR. DUVAL:

Yes.

16

THE JUDGE:

I think it makes sense to do that.

17

This can go on forever.

18

resolved quickly for everyone.

19

along expeditiously if we can.

20

MR. DUVAL:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

I'm sorry.

I wish we would get it

But let's try to move it
Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

23
24
25
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU#
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
City of Cedar Hills,
Plaintiff

:

ORDER

:

Date: June 2, 2008

:

Case Number: 010403694

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

vs.
David C. Harvey, et. al.,
Defendants

This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 4, 2008. The Plaintiff was
present, represented by Eric Todd Johnson, and the Defendants, David and Dixie Harvey, were
also present and represented by counsel, Gordon Duval. Also present was David Church,
representing Cedar Hills in the constitutional rights companion case. The Court ruled from the
bench for summary judgment m favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection, and counsel
for Cedar Hills prepared an order. The Harveys filed an objection to the order, which was, m
substance, a motion to reconsider. After reviewing the proposed order and the objection, the
Court finds and orders:
1.

The operative facts are undisputed. The real property that is the subject of this
dispute is entirely surrounded by incorporated territory, either in Cedar Hills or in
Pleasant Grove. If the Court were to grant the motion for disconnection, the order
would effectively create an island of unincorporated land.

2.

The parties argued over whether the Court should proceed under the 2001 or 2003
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version of the Disconnection statute.
3.

After carefully comparing both versions of the Disconnection statute, the Court
finds that there is no material difference on the dispositive point of law between
the two versions of the statute at issue. Under either the 2001 or 2003 versions of
the Disconnection statute, if a disconnection would result in an unincorporated
island, the disconnection should be disallowed.

4.

Because the disconnection sought by the Harveys in this matter would create an
island of unincorporated territory as prohibited by both the 2001 and 2003
versions of the Disconnection statute, such disconnection is DENIED, and Cedar
Hills is GRANTED summary judgment as to the disconnection issue.

5.

Cedar Hills has agreed to stay the companion case for condemnation (which has
been consolidated into the present case but which was previously case number
010404045) in this matter pending appeal of the disconnection issue.
Accordingly, the companion claim by the Harveys against Cedar Hills for
constitutional rights violations (which has been consolidated into the present case
but which was previously case number 010404044) is also stayed pending appeal
of the disconnection issue.

///
///
///
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6.

Summary judgment in favor of Cedar Hills on the issue of disconnection is
certified as final and appealable.
Dated this 3

day of ^ > i^C

, 2008

Judge Jaines R. Taylor
Fourthiudicial District Cot
A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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